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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> BB v CC [2025] EWHC 959 (Fam) (16 April 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/959.html
Cite as: [2025] EWHC 959 (Fam)

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The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 959 (Fam)
Case No: LU22P00404

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
16th April 2025

B e f o r e :

MRS JUSTICE ARBUTHNOT DBE
____________________

Between:
BB
Applicant
- and -

CC
Respondent

____________________

BB (a litigant-in-person)
Tatiana Rocha (instructed by Clayton Stoke) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 14th March 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was delivered in private on the morning of 14th March 2025. The corrected judgment was handed down by circulation to parties on 16th April 2025.

    .............................

    Introduction

  1. These proceedings concern L who is about two and a half years old. The applicant is the father of the child. He is a litigant in person. The respondent is the mother. L lives with her mother. She is represented by Ms Rocha, instructed by Clayton Stoke Solicitors.
  2. The father's application originally came before the Family Court and was transferred to the High Court due to concerns around the father's mental health and after the father had made a number of complaints about the court staff at the Family Court, the then Judge and the mother's legal representatives.
  3. A fact-finding hearing was conducted by me in May 2024. It was published as BB v CC [2024] EWHC 2693 (Fam). The father was a litigant in person and was assisted by a Qualified Legal Representative. The mother made a number of allegations, all of which I found proved. The findings made included that:
  4. a. the father (through various aliases, notably 'Jamie Gwenstefani') sent abusive and threatening letters to the mother, including threats to rape and kill;
    b. the father (through various aliases, notably 'Jamie Gwenstefani') sent abusive and threatening letters to the mother's family, including threats to rape and kill and sending an envelope containing pins to her blind cousin (on which he could have harmed himself);
    c. the father (through various aliases, notably 'Jamie Gwenstefani') sent abusive and threatening letters to the mother's legal team, including threats to rape and kill;
    d. the father's behaviour amounted to coercive behaviour.

  5. At the conclusion of the two-day fact-finding hearing, the father accepted that Jamie Gwenstefani did not exist and that he had created him. His current position is that he denies sending the abusive correspondence.
  6. Since the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, Ms Shaw of Cafcass has filed a s7 report and addendum. An addendum was necessary as the father initially failed to engage with Cafcass. When interviewed, the father denied the findings made against him.
  7. The father has sent a number of emails to the court, all of which are abusive in nature and make rude comments about the mother's legal team and the judicial system more generally.
  8. The final hearing had been listed in January 2025, but was adjourned at the father's request. He said his mother was seriously ill and he had had to fly abroad to see her. He was asked to provide documentation in support of this but failed to.
  9. The father was aware of today's hearing, but refused to attend. He sent an email to the court on the morning of the hearing confirming he would not be in attendance and reiterating his (recently advanced) position that he no longer sought to have contact with L and seeking for his parental responsibility to be removed.
  10. It would appear that the father, very sadly, suffers from some sort of mental health difficulty which impacts on his behaviour.
  11. There were several issues to be determined at this final hearing:
  12. a. the father's (informal) request for me to recuse myself;
    b. whether the child arrangements order reflecting that L lives with the mother should be finalised, and whether there should be a child arrangements order for no contact between the father and child;
    c. whether the father's responsibility should be removed (on his own request);
    d. whether the court should make a s91(14) barring order and, if so, for how long;
    e. ancillary issues in relation to disclosure of certain papers within proceedings.

    The father's application for recusal and the father's non-attendance

  13. In one of a number of abusive emails sent to the court, the father made a request for me to recuse myself from this matter on the basis that he did not accept the findings made against him.
  14. I have carefully considered the father's application in light of the relevant test: whether the circumstances would lead a 'fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased'.
  15. If a fair-minded and informed observer heard the complicated history of this case and considered the findings made by the court (let alone the abusive emails sent repeatedly), I do not find that the observer would conclude that there was bias.
  16. The father's behaviour throughout these proceedings has been abusive. The court notes the numerous complaints made against previous judges and the judicial system more generally. The email received by court today, making further rude comments against the mother's barrister and solicitor, and even the court, is a continuation of his approach.
  17. The court has given the father every opportunity to attend and engage, most recently adjourning the final hearing in January 2025 having regard to the father's Article 6 rights. The father has chosen not to attend today's hearing. He was aware of the hearing and was given permission to attend remotely following his request.
  18. I have decided not to recuse myself and to proceed in the father's absence.
  19. Child arrangements order

  20. The court made findings, as set out above. Whilst the father had never physically hurt the mother, his threats and behaviour have been threatening and deeply unpleasant. The court found that his behaviour was coercive towards the mother. This would have affected the mother and would have had knock-on effect on L.
  21. When making a decision, L's welfare is my paramount consideration and I have the welfare checklist firmly in mind.
  22. In terms of L's wishes and feelings, whilst L is only young, she would no doubt want to be brought up by the mother in a safe and secure manner. The Cafcass Officer (Ms Shaw), who has provided two reports, has noted a loving close relationship between L and the mother and concluded that the mother is a good mother. Furthermore, L is likely to be too young to remember the father (having last had supervised contact with him in March 2023), there is no ongoing relationship between L and the father. I do not anticipate therefore that she would have a wish currently to see him.
  23. L's physical needs are for a good standard of care, and which I do not consider can be met by the father at the moment. One session of direct contact took place at a contact centre in March 2023, during which the father was not able to comfort L when she was crying. Contact workers were so concerned, that they decided not to support contact any further. They took the unusual decision to terminate contact. In light of this and other concerns raised by professionals, I do not find that the father can meet L's physical needs.
  24. The father's mental health is fluctuating. Sending an email as he has today shows that he is still in the throes of some sort of mental health difficulty. There is no medical evidence before the court but I consider it is most unusual for a litigant in person to email the court accusing legal professionals of being paedophiles, amongst other abusive comments. The father was given a chance and explicitly told by Cafcass to undertake anger management work and has failed to do so. There is no evidence that currently he is willing or able to change, or think of a way he can change. It appears that he has little or no insight into his difficulties. He had not accepted that he ought to do work suggested to him by the Cafcass Officer.
  25. In terms of emotional needs and the risk of harm, L needs to be brought up in house where she has stability and her needs are met. Ideally, she would have a relationship with both parents, but it is not possible for her to have a relationship with the father at this stage. If L were to see the father, there is a real risk of harm to both her and on the mother.
  26. The Cafcass Officer has written two reports and, having considered these alongside the welfare checklist, I have concluded that contact is not in L's best interests. I have found there has been coercive behaviour and abuse continuing to date. It is not in L's best interests to see her father. Significantly too, I note that the father has said that he does not want to have contact with his daughter.
  27. Parental responsibility

  28. In this case, the father has parental responsibility for L. Section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989 provides for a person who has acquired parental responsibility to cease to have parental responsibility if the court so orders. The bar for removing parental responsibility is high because the presumption is that L would benefit from having both parents in her life.
  29. It is the father's (informal) application for his parental responsibility to be removed although I note that the father has made three such applications during the course of these proceedings and then has appeared to change his mind.
  30. It seems that his applications have been made on the basis that if he did not have parental responsibility, he would not have pay child maintenance. I have explained to him at an earlier hearing that this was not likely to be the case.
  31. Prior to hearing submissions, I initially considered simply limiting the father's parental responsibility.
  32. I heard from Ms Rocha who referred me to Re EMP (A Child) (Re Section 8 of the Children Act 1989) [2024] EWFC 12, in which examples are given of when it may be appropriate to terminate parental responsibility.
  33. I set out some of the principles and my findings in this case.
  34. a. There is no contact with the subject child. In this case, the father has not seen L since about March 2023.
    b. The father has caused significant harm to the subject child's mother – this has been found by the court. There is no substantive acknowledgment of findings made, despite his initial admission at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing.
    c. The practical exercise of parental responsibility relates solely to rights – the father has no responsibilities towards the child at all. He does not maintain the child, and has said he does his best to work cash in hand so he does not need to pay child maintenance.
    d. Where the father's continued involvement in the child's life, even at the periphery, adversely affects the mother, therefore indirectly affecting the child. The father has been in and out of proceedings, sometimes even once claiming he had died in a car crash in Germany. Such behaviour destabilises the mother and causes her to worry.
    e. The final thing is that there is positive welfare benefit to L of revoking parental responsibility. Whilst I would encourage the mother to continue to have a relationship with the paternal family if she can, it seems there is a welfare benefit to the father's parental responsibility being removed. This would promote both L and the mother's stability.

  35. In addition to the above considerations, I note that the father has asked, repeatedly, for removal of parental responsibility.
  36. Having looked at relevant factors and his behaviour, it does meet the test for removal of parental responsibility. I was going to restrict his exercise of it rather than terminate it, but on balance termination is more appropriate in the circumstances.
  37. Section 91(14) Barring Order

  38. The mother makes an application for an order under s91(14) Children Act 1989. The Cafcass Officer, Ms Shaw supports such an order being made.
  39. I have regard to the relevant considerations under s91(14) Children Act 1989, as well as FPR 19A which supplements the original power granted to the court.
  40. I note in the course of these proceedings the father has brought and then stopped proceedings repeatedly. This has been over a number of years when the mother has had to come to court on multiple occasions.
  41. I take the view that any application made by the father in relation to L cannot be made without review by the court. It is sensible to protect the child and mother from the father and from the emotional pressure of a further application being made. I consider there is a serious risk to the L, both due to her being present when the father has hurt himself in the past and due to the threats made to the mother.
  42. Having regard to the guidelines set out at paragraph 54 of Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) (Residence and Religious Heritage) [1999] 2 FLR 573, and having carried out a balancing exercise between what is in L's best interests and the Article 8 family rights of the father and L, I conclude that a section 91(14) order is necessary. L is the primary consideration of the court. At the moment, the father's mental health issues are such that he cannot be involved in L's life. A section 91(14) barring order will prevent endless and unproductive applications, or lawfare as has been seen in this case.
  43. I next have to consider the length of such an order. I am reminded that such an order is not a barrier to an application being made but simply an additional filter. Proportionality is key. The father may well obtain mental health support in due course but he is not so inclined currently. I need to protect L and her mother from the repeated applications made by the father from soon after L's birth. As such, the father shall be prohibited from making an application in respect of L without leave of the court until she attains 16 years of age.
  44. Additionally, any application must be supported by evidence of his engagement with relevant support services to address his mental health, anger management and domestic abuse. Any application shall be referred to me in the first instance, and the mother shall not be informed of the same.
  45. Other issues

  46. The mother is granted permission to disclose a copy of the father's email(s) to the Child Maintenance Service insofar as they relate to child maintenance, though they should be redacted save for the relevant paragraphs.
  47. The non-molestation order made by the court on 29 January 2025 shall remain in effect until 28 July 2026, to protect both the mother and the child in this case.


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URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/959.html