NO: B1/2000/3177

Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 296
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM PORTSMOUTH COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE MILLIGAN)
                                   Royal Courts of Justice  
                                  Strand    
                                  London WC2
 
                             Wednesday, 14th February 2001

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE THORPE

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IN THE MATTER OF T
(A child)

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Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone No: 0171‑421 4040 Fax No: 0171‑831 8838
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MRS RV T, the Applicant appeared in Person

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J U D G M E N T
Wednesday, 14th February 2001
1.	LORD JUSTICE THORPE: This is an extremely sad case in which Mrs T applies for permission to appeal the order of His Honour Judge Milligan given in the Portsmouth County Court on 7th August 2000. The case hinges on Mrs T's daughter J who was born on 21st July 1985 who at the time of judgment was therefore 15 years of age.
2.	Through no fault of Mrs T's the early life experience of J was pretty turbulent. Mrs T had a lot of ill health for which she was in no way responsible, she was only the victim, but it did mean that family life for J was constantly fragmented and interrupted to the point that when she was about five years of age she passed into foster care. Mrs T has not seen J since August 1991 some six months after the making of the care order. Since August 1991, J has consistently declined to see her mother although indirect contact has continued. Mrs T vehemently believes in the importance of re‑establishing the relationship and she sought to do that by many, many applications to the Court, opposed by the local authority and the last of these applications was before Judge Milligan, as I have said, on 7th August. But in preparation for it both the local authority and the guardian ad litem filed evidence in opposition and within that evidence was a note written by J on 16th June 2000, i.e. shortly before the hearing, to make a clear statement of her position. She said:
“If she got herself a stable job and a permanent place to live then I would consider seeing her because I would know that she has changed and that I can trust her again. At the moment I do not wish to see her, because I think she should sort her life out before coming into mine again.” 
3.	Thereafter there was a communication from mother to daughter which the judge rightly felt was extremely unfortunate. The card from the mother said:
“Tell the foster mother and social worker you will see me and I will give you a voucher for Woolworths like this one when I visit you, and every time after that I see you.” 
4.	That caused J to react by saying she wanted to an end to the contract, so that is pretty sad.
5.	The judge dismissed the application for contact explaining patiently and sympathetically why he felt obliged to do so. He came to the firm conclusion that J had an understanding and maturity to express her own point of view. He attached considerable importance to the fact that she was to sit ten GCSEs and then move on to A levels and then on to university. She is a bright girl doing well in school and the judge thought it important to support and protect her. The judge pointed out that in the end he had to have regard not so much to the mother's sincere and strong desire to see J as to J's best interests. He reached the very clear conclusion that those best interests required him to dismiss the application.
6.	Mrs T has said he did not have regard to article 8 of the Convention. Well, it is true he does not refer to it expressly but the Act was not then in force and no doubt Mrs T did not take the point. Had she done so, he would have undoubtedly explained that J has rights too, and that it is important where there is a conflict of rights within a family to give careful consideration to the welfare of the child.
7.	Mrs T finally complains that section 91.14 prohibits further application without leave. I am afraid that I believe that order was plainly within the discretion of the judge given the history of frequent past applications and given the fact, as the judge pointed out, that J was on the threshold of an age at which she would decide these things absolutely and the Court will lose its role. For all those reasons I believe that the order below is unimpeachable and this application for permission is dismissed.
(Application for permission dismissed)